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Abstract
In this paper, we explore how tariff and standard-like Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs) introduced
by the EU are related with market conditions in domestic EU markets. While Tariffs work as
a pure tax on import, standard-like NTMs potentially affect costs of both domestic firms and
foreign exporters. NTMs may not necessarily work as protectionist measures and even induce
pro-competitive effects in the domestic market in the longer term, especially if we allow for firms
mobility. The impact could be different for large and small firms. We extend the model by Melitz
and Ottaviano (2008) to include Non-Tariff barriers. We derive some testable implications relating
Non-Tariff barriers to the number of firms selling in the domestic market and average efficiency.
The link between NTMs and domestic market conditions depends on whether they involve new
standards and technical specifications imposed on both domestic and foreign firms, or, rather, the
extension to foreign firms of standards and technical specifications already adopted by domestic
firms. In the first case, there is a decline in the number of firms and in average productivity; in
the second case, NTMs induce pro-competitive effects: an increase in the number of firms and of
average productivity. We then take the model to the data for a group of European countries and
manufacturing industries. We combine Compnet data for 15 EU countries in 2001-2012, providing
information on firms performance at the industry level and by size class, with the STC WTO-I-TIP
database, with information on Specific Trade Concerns raised at the WTO on NTMs and with the
Trains database with information on Tariffs. The NTMs that we consider have similar effects as
in the second NTMs case in the theoretical model; the results for Tariff are in the same direction,
albeit of a larger magnitude. These results are consistent with a theoretical framework allowing for
firms mobility in the longer term.
JEL Classification: F13, F14
Keywords: Tariffs, Non-tariff Measures, Heterogeneous firms, International Trade, EU.
1 Introduction
Standard-like Non-Tariff Measure (NTMs) are generally analysed with respect to their impact
on trade, and their being protectionist measures. In this paper, we take instead the perspective
of domestic producers and look at the effects of NTMs on market conditions in the domestic
economy of the country imposing them and on their exporters. We do this in theory and then
for a sample of European countries and industries, analysed between 2002 and 2015.
From the perspective of domestic firms there is a crucial difference between tariffs and
NTMs. Tariffs work as a pure tax on import, and induce a cost wedge between domestic
and foreign exporters. NTMs may potentially affect the costs of both domestic firms and
foreign exporters. In other words, domestic firms must adopt the same standards and technical
requirements of foreign firms. Consequently, the cost of NTMs is levelled for both domestic
and foreign exporters. As discussed in the literature reviewed in the next section, there are two
different scenarios that should be considered. In the first case the standard or the technical
requirement is new for both sets of firms. Also, domestic ones must adopt it from scratch.
The second case, refers to standards already adopted by domestic firms that are extended to
foreign exporters. Even though this measure only imposes a cost on foreign exporters, it is
not necessarily discriminatory, as it forces foreign exporters to level their production conditions
to those of domestic firms. Still, it may rebalance the competitive advantage and discourage
foreign exports, similarly to tariffs.
In what follows we develop a theoretical framework to analyze these three different options,
(i) the introduction of a tariff, (ii) the adoption of a new NTM by domestic firms and foreign
exporters, (iii) the extension of an already domestically adopted NTM to foreign exporters.
We work within the framework of the model by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), Section 3. We
derive some testable implications relating Non-Tariff barriers to the number of firms selling in
the domestic market and average efficiency.
The theoretical analysis envisages a long-term framework; therefore, it also allows for firms
mobility between the two hypothetical identical countries analysed, country A (domestic) and
country B (foreign). Trade barriers jumping is frequently observed in large markets like the
European Union, think at Japanese automobile producers in the UK. This is more likely with
tariffs, but also with NTMs, because of specialization and of the gains from avoiding two different
technical standards on the same production line.
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We identify the following results for domestic firms. The introduction of a new unilateral
NTM on both domestic and foreign firms, reduces the number of firms producing in the domestic
market and average productivity. This is a long-term result. In the short term (not analysed)
the increased cost of producing at home implies that the number of domestic firms decline, as
the least efficient ones exit. There might be fewer foreign exporters also. In the longer term,
the number of firms based in A will decline further because of mobility. Producing in B is
now more convenient, as the standard is not imposed on domestic sales there. The firms that
will move to B will be the most efficient ones (which can afford the cost of relocation). The
combined effect of the exit of domestic firms and possibly of the decline of foreign exports from
B , will increase the market share of the remaining domestic firms and hence raise the minimum
cost cut off. These counterbalancing effects introduce ambiguity, and will in the end generate
a decline in average productivity, with smaller less productive firms re-entering the market and
also a decline in the share of exporters.
The introduction of a unilateral NTM affecting only foreign firms (as domestic ones have
already introduced it) has opposite effects. Here, the number of domestic firms increases. Also,
as the relative cost of producing abroad is now higher, exporters from B to A will relocate
in A. As generally these are the most efficient firms, the average productivity will increase in
the domestic market A. The second case (NTM only on foreigners) gives identical theoretical
predictions than the inclusion of a tariff, though likely of lower magnitude.
Note that these long term outcomes partly contradict short term expected effects. In the
first case, the introduction of the NTMs by both domestic and foreign firms should have pro-
competitive effects, leading to exit of the least efficient domestic firms and consequently to an
increase in average productivity. In the second case the NTM works as a sort of protectionist
measure, with anticompetitive effects: entry of least productive domestic firms and decline of
average productivity. It is only the longer term relocation of firms that reverts these two results.
In the end we have less firms, but lower average productivity in the first case, and more firms,
but higher average productivity in the second case.
We then take the model to the data for a group of European countries and manufacturing in-
dustries. We combine CompNet data for 16 EU countries in 2002-2012, providing information on
firms’ performance at the industry level and by size class, with the STC WTO-I-TIP database,
providing information on Specific Trade Concerns (STC) raised at the WTO on NTMs, and with
the TRAINS database providing information on Tariffs. The empirical analysis exploits cross
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industry and cross-country heterogeneity in trade barriers (see section 3). Even though both
NTMs concerned raised by foreign trade partners and tariffs are the same for all EU countries,
their different trade structures make them differently affected by NTMs and tariffs.
In the empirical analysis (Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 ), we employ two measures of NTM protection
built by using data on STC raised to Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) committee. Therefore,
we consider those TBT that are perceived as trade barriers. We investigate the effects of
these TBT protection measures and of tariffs on market conditions of the country imposing
the measure, in terms of number of firms and average productivity; we investigate whether
and to what extent these effects are heterogeneous across firms, and therefore also affect firms’
distribution.
Most empirical results confirm broadly the theoretical predictions. As for TBT we find
results consistent with the second model of NTMS, those regarding only foreign producers.
Here, the number of firms increases, especially large firms and also average efficiency increases.
2 Related Literature
A recent stream of literature investigates the role of standard-like NTMs, also called technical
measures, namely, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS) and Technical Barriers to trade
(TBT) 1, with respect to trade flows and welfare.
Standard-like NTMs are not introduced with a protectionist aim, at least not explicitly.
Their scope is to increase the quality of goods and/or reduce informational asymmetries (Gour-
don, 2014). Nonetheless, these measures could also hide the aim to build a barrier to trade.
Moreover, even if welfare enhancing, restricting trade might be a side outcome, because costs of
compliance might be different across countries, in particular developed and developing countries
(Disdier et al., 2008; Marette and Beghin, 2010), and also within countries across heterogeneous
firms (Fontagne´ et al., 2015).
Because of the potential trade reducing effects of standard-like NTMs, since 1995, the WTO
agreements on standards require members to notify information on their imposed measures for
transparency. Then a Specific Trade Concern can be activated, when a member (ore more than
1SPS are measures affecting areas such as restriction for substances, restriction for non eligible countries’
hygienic requirements, or other measures for preventing dissemination of diseases; all conformity assessment
measures related to food safety, such as certification, testing and inspection, and quarantine; TBT are mea-
sure such as labelling, marking, packaging, restriction to avoid contamination or other measures protecting the
environment, standards on technical specifications and quality requirements (Gourdon, 2014)
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one) raises a concern to the WTO according to which a specific measure is perceived as a barrier
to exporting in the country imposing the measure.
For the fact that they are not introduced with protectionist aims, this per se’ opening room
for ambiguities and controversial assessments, standard-like NTMs differ intrinsically from tra-
ditional trade barriers (Non-technical measures and tariffs)2 in their economic implications along
several dimensions, by working as potential supply and demand shifters (Beghin et al., 2015b;
Fugazza, 2013). When standard-like NTMs imply a cost, e.g. to adapt the production process,
to buy higher quality intermediate goods and inputs, to comply with the standard, typically
both domestic and foreign firms bear this cost, while traditional barriers affect foreign firms
only. But it could also be the case that domestic firms already met the standard in the country
introducing the technical measure, which would in this case have potentially discriminatory ef-
fects with respect to foreign firms. On the other hand, in a world of heterogeneous firms, better
foreign suppliers might satisfy the standard at a lower cost than domestic ones or vice-versa
(Beghin et al., 2015b; Marette and Beghin, 2010). In general, the effects on trade depend on
the relative cost of compliance across countries.
Standard-like NTMs can work as supply shifter by increasing the quality of the good or input,
but also by solving technical incompatibilities and/or easing trust in buyer-supplier relationships
(Jouanjean, 2012), this increasing matching opportunities. Depending on the measure and on
the characteristics of the industry involved, they can help solving information asymmetries,
reducing transaction costs in buyer-supplier relationships along the global value chain. They
can also increase costs, marginal of fixed, of compliance and/or they shift these costs from buyer
to suppliers with potential advantages for large suppliers (Beghin et al., 2015b). The extent of
the supply shift will depend on the measure and the industry involved, but also on the size and
geographical location of the firm. According to Beghin et al. (2015b) the effect of standard-like
NTMs along the global supply chain is country, sector and standard specific, in some cases
favouring large suppliers, in some others small firms.
They can also work as (final) demand shifter (Sturm, 2006; Tian, 2003), increasing the
willingness to pay of consumers by increasing or certifying the quality or safety of the good
(Disdier and Marette, 2010), solving information issues (Liu and Yue, 2009; Xiong and Beghin,
2014). Again, small firms and/or firms located in the South may benefit more than large firms
2Non-technical measures are the subset of measures under categories from D to P in the Unctad classification
of NTMs (Gourdon, 2014).
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from complying with the standard.
In general, the protectionist effects of standard type NTMs are ambiguous both because of
heterogeneity across foreign and domestic producers (Marette and Beghin, 2010), and because
they can be instrumental to overcome market failures and reduce negative externalities (Beghin
et al., 2015a). The evidence on the effects of standard-like NTMs on trade flows is actually
mixed, the results showing both trade enhancing and trade restrictive consequences depending
on the country pairs, on the sector and on the measure considered (Beghin et al., 2015a; Cadot
and Gourdon, 2016; Carrere, 2011).
The introduction of a standard measure can generate contrasting effects on firms’ domestic
and international activities. Moreover, since these effects are likely to be heterogeneous across
firms of different size and productivity, the standard-like NTMs will also affect competition in
the domestic market, with consequences on efficiency, prices and varieties availability.
Our work is related to three main stream of literature. The first one is the group of con-
tributions assessing the potential protectionist effect of standard-like NTMs, by analyzing the
relationship between NTMs and trade flows (Anders and Caswell, 2007; Disdier et al., 2008;
Kee et al., 2009; Wilson and Otsuki, 2004; Xiong and Beghin, 2014).3 The firm level evidence
looking at firms’ exporting margins is usually focused on the effects of standard-like NTMs in
destination markets on firms’ exporting activities. Fontagne´ et al. (2015), using French custom
data and STC on SPS show that both small firms and, to a lesser extent, large firms are nega-
tively affected by NTMs measure in the destination markets (both along the extensive and the
intensive margin). The literature looking at the effects of standard-like NTMs in developing
countries reach also mixed results, some of them showing an export enhancing effect for the
firms, in particular large exporters, bearing the cost to met the standard (Chen et al., 2008;
Henson et al., 2011; Martincus et al., 2010; Otsuki, 2011), others finding a negative effect for
firms’ exporting activities (Schuster and Maertens, 2015). Cadot and Gourdon (2016) looks
instead at the effects of NTMs on the price of imported goods and the role of regional trade
agreements as mediating factors in the relationship between NTMs and prices.
A second group of contributions indirectly related to our work investigates the effects of
standard-like NTMs on the labour market in the country imposing the standards (Leonardi and
Meschi, 2017) or in the country specialized in exporting a good on which a standard has been
3For a comprehensive review on approaches and computation of NTMs see Beghin et al. (2015b) and Carrere
(2011).
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imposed by trade partners (Colen et al., 2012).
Our work is also related to the heterogeneous firms’ stream of literature, where the effects of
variations in trade policy on firms and productivity depend on the type of trade costs affected
and theoretical setup. In the standard CES model with heterogeneous firms (Melitz, 2003), an
(symmetric) increase in the iceberg trade costs or fixed costs generate a similar outcome: an
increase in the number of domestic producers and a reduction in the aggregate productivity.
However empirical evidence suggests that changes in trade costs have heterogenous effects across
firms with different size. For example, Nataraj (2011) finds that trade liberalization in India
increased the average productivity of the firms at the top of the distribution. 4
The removal of standard assumptions, such as CES, generates additional insights. Intro-
ducing heterogeneous demand elasticities, Spearot (2013) shows that imported varieties with
high elasticity are the most harmed by an increase in tariff while low elasticity varieties not. 5
Using indirectly additive preferences, Bertoletti et al. (2017) provide evidence that small firms
are more harmed by an increase in the iceberg trade cost, compared to large firms.
Heterogeneity arises also from different trade costs (additive or multiplicative). Irarrazabal
et al. (2015) provide evidence that the introduction of an additive import tariff is more harmful
(in term of welfare and trade) than the corresponding multiplicative tariff.
In general, assumptions on consumers preferences and the characteristics of trade costs are
crucial to define the effects of changes in the trade policy.
3 Theoretical Model: Non tariff Measures: Regulatory Stan-
dards
3.1 Closed Economy
We use the model in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).(henceforth M-O). The closed economy is
characterized by a continuum of firms, each one producing a single variety of a product, with
cost function C(q) = cq, where c is specific to each firm, and results after a firm has decided to
enter the market, from a random draw by Nature. Firms with too high a cost, in a sense to be
specified later, will have to exit after entry. The demand function to each firm is derived by a
4Mion and Zhu (2013) show that an increase in the import competition from China in WTO did not reduce
the survival probability of Belgian firms.
5Similarly to our model, Spearot (2013) assumes that consumer preferences are quasi-linear as in Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008).
7
quasi-linear utility function U = q0 + α
∫
qidi− γ2
∫
(qi)
2 − η2
(∫
qidi
)2
, where all the integrals
are defined over the space of available varieties, q0 is a numeraire good, qi is quantity of variety
of a differentiated good with index i, while γ measures the degree of product differentiation
among varieties. The maximum price is a function of the utility function parameters and of the
size of the country if in autarky and of the two countries under free trade. The inverse demand
function is of the form pi = α − γqi − ηQc, where Qc =
∫
qidi. The maximum price p
max is
a function of the utility function parameters and of the size of the country - if in autarky -
and of the two countries under free trade. The resulting per-firm profit function in a closed
economy is pi(c) = (L/4γ) (cD − c)2 where L is the population size and cD = pmax is the cut-off
cost for surviving firms. The support of c is [0,M ], the distribution is assumed to be Pareto,
namely G(c) = (c/M)k over [0,M ].Let w ≡ cD be the cut-off cost, then under the assumption
of a Pareto distribution , and letting ω(L) = kL
4γMk
the expected profit from entry is a linear
transformation of
I(c, w) ≡
∫ w
0
(c− w)2ck−1dc, (1)
Then, expected profit is
E(pi) = ω(L)
∫ w
0
(w − c)2ck−1dc (2)
A firm has to pay an entry cost f to enter the market and this cost is sunk after entry. Ex-ante
entry is profitable only if expected profit is non-negative and in the long run entry shall occur
till the expected profit from entry is zero, or till E(pi) = f . Let E(pi) = f , then (2) provides a
solution for the cutoff cost:
(
c0D
)k+2 ≡ 2(f/L)Mkγ(k + 2)(k + 1). (3)
If a standard leads to a marginal cost increase equal to s the support of the cost distribution
is translated from c to q ∈ [s,M + s] where q = c + s. The cut-off now must satisfy q = pmax;
or cD + s = p
max . The distribution is G(q) = ((q − s) /M)k. The zero profit condition before
entry becomes:
E(pi|s) = ω(L)
∫ z
s
(z − q)2(q − s)k−1dc = L
2γMk
(z − s)k+2
(k + 2) (k + 1)
. (4)
Since z is the cutoff in the shifted support then c
′
D = z − s is the cut-off in terms of the base
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(or ”identity”) variable c. Inspection of (4) reveals that setting E(pi|s) = f implies a solution
such that z − s = cD, where cD is the original value. Hence the new cost cutoff is equal to
the original one6 plus s. The after-entry profit however is reduced for each firm. This makes
entry less attractive ex-ante, leading to a reduction of the number of entrants in the industry.
The lower number of entrants allows pmax (and hence the cutoff cost) to increase. Average
price is increased so that a lower quantity of the differentiated good is bought at equilibrium
- while consumer will buy more of the numeraire good. The number of firms operating in the
industry will decrease, as from Equation 16 in M-O, namely N0s = 2(k + 1)(γ/η)
(α−cD)
cD
, due to
an increase in the cutoff from cD to cD + s.
It is important to consider here that we are not allowing the standard to increase α , namely
the utility of the differentiated good. In that case the result on the cut-off and on the numeraire
would be ambiguous.
3.2 Open Economy.
In an open economy the introduction of a standard will raise costs for the home firms but it will
also increase costs to foreign exporters. Country A, where the standard is introduced, will be
less attractive as a location for production, but country B now is also affected because exports
to A from B are more expensive than before the standard. Therefore the question is whether
the increase in the cut-off cost for the home country hurts production and efficiency in A or
B, and what are the effects on trade flows. The answer will clearly depend also on the effect
of the standard on the cutoff cost of country B. Let cAX represent the cutoff cost for the firms
based in A exporting to B. Due to export costs of the iceberg form a unit exported arrives in
country B with weight less than 1 hence the cost of a unit carried to country B from A is τB.c
where τB > 1(respectively τA for exports in the reverse direction). One can interpret the τ
′s
as incorporating tariff and transportation costs. To survive in country B an exporter from A
must have cost at most equal to cAX ≡ cBD/τB (symmetrically cBX ≡ cAD/τA). Letting λ = k4γMk .
The zero expected profit condition before entry is:
LA
∫ cAD
0
(
cAD − c
)2
ck−1dc+ LB (τB)2
∫ cAX
0
(
cAX − c
)2
ck−1dc = f/λ, (5)
6The integral in (4) is also equal to ω(L)
∫ z−s
0
(z − s− c)2(c)k−1dc
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or,
LA
(
cAD
)k+2
+ LB (τB)
2 (cAX)k+2 = γφ (6)
where φ = 2(k+ 1)(k+ 2)Mkf. Then, using the equalities ciX = c
J
D/τ
J and letting ρi = 1/τi for
i = A,B one obtains a system of two equations in two unknowns:
LA
(
cAD
)k+2
+ LBρB
(
cBD
)k+2
= γφ
LB
(
cBD
)k+2
+ LAρA
(
cAD
)k+2
= γφ
whence the solutions cA0D and c
A0
D satisfy:
(
cA0D
)k+2
=
γφ
LA
1− ρB
1− ρAρB and
(
cB0D
)k+2
=
γφ
LB
1− ρA
1− ρAρB .
3.3 Marginal-cost-increasing standard
Let c in [0,M ] define the identity cost for firm c. Firms with identity cost c > z − s will exit
after entry, where z is the cut-off under the support shift (z = cD + s). Let uj = c
j
D − s for
j = A,B and wj = c
j
X − s. Let h =
(
k
4γMk
)−1
f , then the zero expected profit conditions7
write as:
LA
(
cAD − s
)k+2
+ LB (τB)
−k (cBD − s)k+2 = γφ (a)
LB
(
cBD
)k+2
+ LA (τA)
−k (cAD − s)k+2 = γφ (b)
where cAX − s =
cBD
τB
− s and cBX − s =
cAD
τA
− s .
Although an analytical solution is hard to find due to the term
(
cBD
)k+2
in the second
equation we can state:
RESULT 1: An increase from zero to s > 0 of marginal cost due to a standard in the home
country raises the cutoff cost cAD − s defining the identity of firms that makes zero profits after
7In terms of the integrals like in (1) they are:
LAI(c, uA) + L
B (τB)
2 I(c, wB) = h (A)
LBI(c, uB) + L
A (τA)
2 I(c, wA) = h (B)
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entry in Home. It raises the domestic effective cut off cost z by an amount larger than s. It
decreases the cutoff cost in the foreign country, and it also decreases the cut off for exporters in
B.
In Home the competitive pressure decreases leading to a lower number of entrants and of
surviving firms, and to a lower average productivity. The average price in country A (home)
increases8. Furthermore,
RESULT 2: The proportion of exporters from the home country decreases.
PROOF: The ratio G(cAX − s)/G(cAD − s), namely the proportion of exporters in the Home
country is the ratio
((
cBD/τB
)− s)k / (cAD − s)k. The effect of an increase in s on the numerator
is negative while that on the denominator is positive. Q.E.D.
By the same token, the proportion of exporters in the foreign country increases. The number
of firms selling in country A, NA, decreases since it is given by NA = 2(k+1)γη
a−z
z . By the same
token, NB increases. The number of entrants in country A also decreases. It is given by:
NAE =
Mk
1− ρAρB
[
NA(
cAD − s
)k − ρA NB(
cBD
)k
]
,
and hence it decreases since the first ratio in square brackets decreases and the second increases.
Finally, the number of firms located in A that survive, G(cAD − s)NAE decreases. Therefore we
can state:
Proposition 1 (summary for effects of a standard in Home): A standard that raises marginal
costs - and does not raise the utility of the good - has the following long run effects: the profitabil-
ity of locating in the home country vis-a-vis the foreign country decreases, hence the number of
entrants in the home country decreases. The maximum price at which the good is sold increases
and hence so does the cutoff cost for a firm located in A. The number of firms selling in A
decreases, the number of firms located in A decreases, and so does the proportion of exporting
home firms. The average marginal cost increases. The support of the distribution of costs is
wider. The average price increases.
8It is given by p˜A =
2k+1
2k+2
(cAD + s).
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3.4 Tariff
A marginal cost increasing standard imposed by country H is different from a tariff because
a tariff, t, is paid only by the foreign firms. The profit of the foreign exporter is changed to
piBX(c, t) = (L
A/4γ) (τA)
2 (cAD − t− c)2.
Setting τA = 1 be the original iceberg cost for A, to simplify, the new iceberg cost τ
′
A such
that delivered cost τ ′Ac = c + t; then τ
′
A =
t
c
+ 1 varies inversely with c. This is a slight
modification with respect to M-O, who only consider direct changes in τB , however this has no
consequence on the main results.
Only firms in B with costs c < cAD − t can export to A hence the population of foreign
exporters is, regarding their identity cost, more efficient than before the tariff, but the tariff
offsets this cost advantage and their average price increases. The cut-off costs are given by the
solutions to:
LA
(
cAD
)k+2
+ LB (τB)
−k (cBD)k+2 = h (At)
LB
(
cBD
)k+2
+ LA (τA)
−k (cAD − t)k+2 = h. (Bt)
It is straightforward to show that:
RESULT 4: The cutoff cost for the home country decreases after a per-unit tariff is unilaterally
introduced by the same country.
An increase in the tariff is equivalent to a decrease in ρA. The cut off costs c
A
D is decreased
since ρA is decreased. By contrast the cut off costs c
B
D is increased. Then we can follow M-O
on this account. The number of entrants in A increases, while in B decreases.
The number of sellers in country home (A) increases and in B decreases.
RESULT 4 : The proportion of exporters from A to B G(cAX)/G(c
A
D) = G(c
B
D/τB)/G(c
A
D)
increases.
The number of sellers in country A may increase or decrease: NA = G(cAD)N
A
E +G(c
B
X)N
B
E is
a sum of two terms with size depending upon, among other things, the size of the two countries.
For the same reason, since the imported products in A will be sold at a higher price than before
the tariff, the net effect on average price of goods sold at home is ambiguous.
Proposition 2 (summary for effects of a tariff in Home): A unit tariff has the following long-run
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effects in home: the profitability of locating in the home country vis-a-vis the foreign country
increases (protectionist effect), hence the number of entrants in the home country increases.
The maximum price at which the good is sold decreases and hence so does the cutoff cost for a
firm located in A. The number of firms selling in A increases, the number of firms located in
A increases, and so does the proportion of exporting home firms. The average marginal cost
decreases. The support of the distribution of costs is narrower. The average price decreases.
3.5 Standards that ”follow” already adopted practices
If firms regulators impose standards that are already largely adopted by the home firms, the
cost increase will be felt only by a portion of the home firms, but by all the foreign firms. An
extreme situation is one where all the home firms have already adopted the standard before it
becomes mandatory. This is also the easiest situation to analyze.
If there is no cost increase in home, then equation (a) above is unchanged while that for the
foreign country becomes:
(B′) LB
(
cBD
)k+2
= h− LA (τA)−k
(
cAD − τAs
)k+2
.
This can be used to rewrite (a) as:
LA
(
cAD
)k+2
+ (τB)
−k
[
h− LA (τA)−k
(
cAD − τAs
)k+2]
= h.
By differentiating this equation one obtains:
dcAD
ds
[(
cAD
)k+1 − (τAτB)−k (cAD − τAs)k+1] = − (τAτB)−k (cAD − τAs)k+1 ,
hence
(
dcAD/ds
)
< 0, where the sign follows from the positive sign of the term in square brackets.
Furthermore one can show9 that
(
dcAD/ds
)
> 0, so that all the results concerning the effect of
a standard are reversed if compared with the case of a marginal cost increasing standard of
Proposition 1.
Hence the asymmetry in the impact of a standard, when it only affects the foreign firms,
reverses the sign of the effect on the cutoffs for the home and foreign country. All the perfor-
9Write LB
(
cBD
)k+2−h = −LA (τA)−k (cAD − τAs)k+2. Then differentiate to get the result, given that dcADds < 0
has benn proven already.
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mance indicators will vary in the same direction as for a tariff and opposite to the change of a
standard that involves an increase in marginal cost equal at home as abroad. Furthermore one
can infer what follows: let si, for i = A,B, denote the marginal cost increase implied by the
standard in country i; imagine that ∆s ≡ sB − sA ≥ 0, then for ∆s larger than some threshold
value, the results would be in the same direction as those of a tariff as in Proposition 2. While,
for sA = sB and by continuity for ∆s smaller than the threshold value, the results would be
those of Proposition 1. One can also speculate that the intensity of the changes will be small
for small values of ∆s in a neighbourhood of the threshold value.
Summing up, if there is a substantial difference in the cost burden implied by the standard in
favour of the home country firms,the changes in the number of firms, productivity, and fraction
of exporters will be in line with those of a tariff. The results will be reversed only for standards
leading to cost increases that are close enough across countries.
4 Data
We combine three major data sources. First, we use a database on specific trade concerns
(STC) raised to TBT at WTO. Second, we consider the average applied tariff using the database
from TRAINS. Finally, we retrieve information on market condition using CompNet, a recent
database on aggregate statistics computed from firm-level data.
4.1 Non Tariff and Tariff Barriers
The first data source is the STC database on the Non Tariff Measure (NTM) notifications to the
WTO from the Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal (I-TIP). It includes relevant information
from TBT committee (Ghodsi et al., 2015). 10 This committee provides a platform to WTO
members to settle issues related to regulation on product standards, in order to avoid discrimi-
natory practices that create unnecessary obstacles to trade. TBT standards have to be notified
to WTO and are applied to both domestically produced and imported goods. Notifications
apply to existing or in the pipeline norms. If a TBT measure create ” an unnecessary obstacles
to trade”, one ore more WTO member states may raise a concern to the committees in order
10TBT product requirements established by governments with the objective to protect human health and safety,
environment, or quality. The STC database on the Non Tariff Measure (NTM) includes also information from
SPS committee: SPS measures aims at ensuring food safety, and preventing the spread diseases among animals
and plants. Since SPS mainly regards a few sectors, i.e. Food (10), Wood (16) and Chemical (20), we conduct
our analysis by focusing on TBT measures only.
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to ask the removal of the measure. Therefore, when a specific TBT measure is perceived as an
obstacle to trade, a concern is raised (see Section A for more details).
The STC database records both countries that raise the concerns, 11 the country which
imposes the standard, and the product covered by the measure. The STC database reports
information at HS 6-digit level so we use products and HS 6-digit as synonymous. Finally, the
STC database includes the year in which the concern has been raised and whether it has been
resolved. 12 Therefore, when a country raise a concern over a measure/standard, it suggests
that this specific measure is perceived as an effective barrier to trade. Therefore, a product is
protected by a NTM if a concern has been raised and not resolved: in that case we consider a
specific good covered by a NTM (see Section 4.3).
Another potential source on non-tariff trade measure is TRAINS database. However this
source has two main drawbacks. First, NTMs from TRAINS are not updated since 2001 so
that this source is not compatible with CompNet (see section 4.2). Second, TRAINS records
NTM (only a part of them) without mentioning if a specific regulation is as a barrier to trade
or not: such information is retrieved through a survey on exporters perceptions of obstacles to
foreign-market access. Therefore, we prefer to use WTO STC database.
The STC database is merged with tariff data from TRAINS database. The tariff dataset
includes information on the effectively applied tariff (AHS) at HS-6 digit level for each year and
country pairs. 13 Finally, we merge STC and tariff data using HS-6 digit classification. To be
consistent with our empirical analysis, we consider European Union (in STC and tariff data) as
the importing country which imposes a tariff or set a TBT measure.
4.2 CompNet
Under the coordination of the European Central Bank, 17 national central banks 14 have pro-
duced a set of harmonized and comparable sector-year level indicators based on national firm-
11In addition, STC database includes “anonymous ” NTM concerns for which the country raising the concern
is unknown (while the imposing country is known).
12In most of the cases concerns are closed with a gentlemen agreement between parts (Fontagne´ et al., 2015).
As a rule of thumb, we consider closed a concern after two years. Results are unaffected if we use a period of
three years.
13The effectively applied tariff is defined as the lowest available tariff. If a preferential tariff exists, it will be
used as the effectively applied tariff. Otherwise, the Most Favourite Nation tariff will be used. We use weighted
tariff at 6-digit level, namely the average of tariffs weighted by their corresponding trade value across 8-digit
products.
14Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Lithuania, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. We are going to use in the current analysis the fourth release.
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level samples (Lopez-Garcia and di Mauro, 2014).15 For each triple NACE rev.2 2-digit sector,
country, and year, the indicators available are, among the others, number of firms, number of
exporting firms as well as other information such as average labor productivity or employment
level.
CompNet comprises two different samples. The “full sample” is produced from countries’
samples based on firms with at least one employee and covers the period 1995-2012, while the
“20E sample” is restricted to firms with at least 20 employees and covers the period 1995-2012.16
However, the “20E sample” ensures a relatively higher degree of representativeness because the
“full sample” in some cases do not cover smaller firms (those with less than 10 employees in
Poland, less than 20 employees in Slovakia, less than 750,000 euros of turnover in France), and
in the other cases tend to be biased towards medium and large firms (such a bias is severe for
Austria and Germany). To improve representativeness and homogeneity across countries, the
“20E sample” has been enriched by a weighting scheme based on the total number of firms by
country-year-sector-size class taken from Eurostat Structural Business Statistics (SBS). Thus,
“20E sample” is the most appropriate database for cross-country analysis.
4.3 Protection Index
In order to merge STC-Tariff database with CompNet, we need to construct indicators of
protection with both tariff and non tariff measures which are defined at country, sector (Nace
rev2 2-digit), and year level. The computation of a protection index raises two issues. First,
CompNet data are disaggregated by country and sector level while trade protection, in particular
for NTM, is defined at product and European Union level. 17 Second, HS nomenclature has to
be aggregated at Nace Rev.2-2 digit.
To harmonize nomenclatures, we use correspondence tables from the World Integrated Trade
Solutions (WITS) and RAMON-Eurostat databases. In order to identify HS-6 digit products
within each Nace rev.2-2 digit, we proceed as follows. First we consider HS 2002 revision for
STC and tariff database. 18 Second, we use correspondence between HS2002 and HS2007,
15The unit of analysis is the firm. Self-employed (physical persons with economic activity) are generally not
included.
16Both samples are slightly unbalanced: for example, Portugal data begin in 2006, while Belgian ones end in
2011.
17Some of the concerns in the STC database are registered as imposed by a specific EU country. We do not
use this piece of information. It accounts for the xxx% of concerns against EU,in the period of analysis.
18In particular, HS2002 allows us to have the largest set of information for the period 2002-2012 (CompNet)
both in terms of tariff, STC, and imports from a unique datasource
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and between HS2007 and CPA2008. Once we have the correspondence between HS2002 and
CPA2008, we could aggregate all HS2002-6 digit within the first two digits of CPA2008: the
first two digit of CPA 2008 corresponds to NACE rev. 2-2 digit.
In order to compute the degree of protection (due to tariff or TBT) for each CompNet
country c and sector s, we first define the average tariff imposed to extra-EU exporters for each
CompNet country c, as follows
T cjs =
P (s)∑
p(s)=1
tEUjp
importc2000jp
importc2000js
∀ j ∈ s (7)
In Eq. 7, j is the exporting country, e.g., China, s is the NACE rev2-2 digit sector, p is the
product (HS-6 digit) that belongs to the NACE rev2, c is a CompNet country, and tEUjp is the
tariff imposed by EU to product p from country j or the STC raised by country j against EU
for a product p. Notice that, with TBT, the term tEUjp takes value of one if a concern has been
raised by country j versus the EU in product p, otherwise it is zero.
The EU protection measure (tEUjp ) is apportioned across CompNet countries using specific
weights which consider if a tariff (or TBT) in product p from origin j can be relevant for
country c. Using the import share, we measure if a good p accounts for a large quota of imports
from origin j in sector s; the second term in the r.h.s. of Eq. 7 is defined by importc2000jp and
importc2000js which are the imports of product p in country c from j and the total imports in
sector s from j, respectively. Weights are constant over time and refer to year 2000 in order to
minimize endogeneity concerns arising from reverse causality. 19
Finally, we compute the average protection (due to tariff or TBT) for CompNet country c
in sector s as
ProtectionIndexcs =
J∑
j=1
T cjs
importc2000js
importc2000tot,s
. (8)
Similarly to Eq. 7, ProtectionIndexcs is computed using as weights the relative share of
imports from origin j to total imports, for a given sector s. In the empirical analysis (see
Section 5), we ProtectionIndexcs to measure both protection raising from Tariff and TBT.
20
19Imports data are from BACI database. Imports are collected at HS 6-digit level. We use the same aggregation
procedure for trade data (HS 2002, HS 2007, CPA 2008, and NACE rev.2)
20Notice that TBT protection index can be written as
TBTcs =
J∑
j=1
P (s)∑
p(s)=1
TBTEUjp
importc2000jp
importc2000tot,s
(9)
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We define an alternative measure for the degree of protection originated by TBT using the
share of protected products within NACE 2-digit sectors. First, we compute, for each sector s,
the share of products p sourced by country of origin j under TBT concern.
sharesj =
1
N.Products(s)
P (s)∑
p(s)=1
TBTEUjp (10)
Therefore, variable share includes the sum of all TBT concerns raised by country j over all
products p which belong to sector s. The denominator of Eq. 10 is the number of products in
sector s. In order to redistribute TBT across EU countries, we define TBT protection index
(TBT (share)) as follows,
TBT (share)cs =
J∑
j=1
sharesj
importc2000js
importc2000tot,s
(11)
where the weight measure the share of imports from country j in sector s for a CompNet
country c (in 2000). 21
4.4 Descriptive Statistics
In the period of analysis (2002-2012), 19,245 concerns were raised against European Union
(almost the 15% of total concerns raised at WTO committees); most of them are TBT concerns
(11,864). 22 Using these information and TRAINS data , we compute three indices to measure
the average trade protection through tariff and TBT (see Section 4.3)
combining Eq. 7 and Eq. 8. It is straightforward to observe that Eq. 9 ranges from 0 to 1. If zero, none of the
products p are recorded with a concern. If one, all the products p are under concerns.
21As Eq. 9, we can write TBT (share)cs combining Eq. 10 and Eq. 12
TBT (share)cs =
1
N.Products(s)
J∑
j=1
P (s)∑
p(s)=1
TBTEUjp
importc2000js
importc2000tot,s
. (12)
22These numbers refers to all the concerns (agriculture and manufacturing) including those concerns for whom
we have not information on the complaining country
18
The protection index is usually higher for tariff than for TBT, mainly for two reasons (see
Table 1). First, most of the products within a NACE sector are not subject to concerns23.
For each product, more than a country can raise a concern or none of the products are under
concern. On average, 1000 concerns (485 TBT) are raised every year against the European
Union, with a peak in 2008 and 2009 (1600 in both years) and none in 2005 and 2007.Consider
that there are more than 5 thousands products (within 6 digit classification) so that in most of
the cases TBT (Eq. 8) takes value of zero. Sector such as Food (10), Beverages (11), Chemicals
(20), Motor Vehicles (29), and Other Manufacturing (32) are the most protected from TBT.
Table 1: Sector average protection ‡
Sector Nace rev.2 code Tariff TBT TBT(share)
Food 10 1.7134 0.0067 0.0036
Beverages 11 1.1666 0.0080 0.0030
Tobacco 12 0.1643 0.0000 0.0000
Textile 13 3.7671 0.0026 0.0005
Wearing Apparel 14 6.6400 0.0000 0.0000
Leather 15 3.3266 0.0000 0.0000
Wood 16 0.6771 0.0000 0.0000
Paper 17 0.0730 0.0000 0.0000
Printing 18 0.5031 0.0104 0.0104
Coke/Petroleum 19 0.0968 0.0000 0.0000
Chemicals 20 2.2779 0.0093 0.0031
Pharmaceuticals 21 0.1712 0.0045 0.0037
Rubber/Plastic 22 1.7368 0.0033 0.0003
Non Metallic Minerals 23 2.2155 0.0007 0.0003
Basic Metals 24 1.3236 0.0000 0.0000
Fabricated Metals 25 1.6052 0.0005 0.0024
Computer/Electronics 26 1.0203 0.0038 0.0007
Electrical Equipment 27 1.0183 0.0016 0.0028
Machinery 28 0.8103 0.0120 0.0103
Motor Veichles 29 4.8104 0.0202 0.0123
Other Transport 30 1.6176 0.0005 0.0003
Furniture 31 0.1179 0.0000 0.0000
Other Manufacturing 32 0.9354 0.0292 0.0223
Total 1.6430 0.0049 0.0033
‡ Source: Our calculation from TRAINS and STC database. Tariff and
TBT computed as in Eq.7 and Eq.8. TBT(share) computed as in Eq.12
Figure 2 shows how the average trade protection for CompNet countries has evolved over
time. In particular, TBT protection has risen during the period 2008-2012. 24 In that years
EU introduced several new regulations and standards which have been notified to the WTO
committees. In December 2006, EU introduced the new regulation on chemicals products and
23Notice that goods under concerns are a sub-sample of products for whom a TBT notification exists. Notifi-
cations are a sub-sample of all existing products.
24Similar patterns have been observed by Fontagne´ et al. (2015).
19
created the European Chemicals Agency 25, while the “Classification, Labelling and Packaging”
regulation (CLP), to harmonize European system of labelling for chemicals products, has been
declared in December 2008. 26 These new regulations aim to protect human health and envi-
ronment through a more detailed analysis of chemicals substances used in all types of products
(not only pure chemicals products). In light of these objectives, the regulation has been notified
to WTO and trade partners can raise concerns against EU standards. In 2008, 1029 concerns
were raised against EU in chemical sector. 27 Similarly, in 2007 and 2008 it has been introduced
new regulations in food and wine labelling in particular for organic products 28 We may observe
a similar pattern for the TBT share (see Figure 3).
Tariff protection is more constant over time with the exclusion of a small peak in 2007
mainly due to Textile and Wearing Apparel sector. 29 For example, between 2006 and 2007,
the average tariff from China in cotton sector (HS -50) has increased by 15% (then 2008, the
short term measures for trade in textiles, due to China entry in WTO has expired).
Finally, we can observe that there exists a certain degree of heterogeneity in term of pro-
tection across countries. Even if trade policy is common across European countries, the degree
of protection varies across countries for our computed indices (see Table 3). Most protected
countries by tariff (according to our index) seem Germany, France and Portugal. Conversely
TBT seems to protect especially Belgium, Italy and France. Therefore, our protection index
show some variability across CompNet countries (see Figure 1, Figure 2 , and Figure 4 in the
appendix).
Finally, Table 4 reports CompNet descriptive statistics and in particular the number of firms
and the average productivity within countries. Number of firms is the total number of firms,
with whom CompNet statistics have been computed. Given that we use the “20E sample” (see
Section 4.2), number of firms is not informative of the whole population of firms, but only for
the sub-sample with more than 20 employees.
25See Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006, which defined the “Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restric-
tion of Chemicals” (REACH), established a European Chemicals Agency.
26See Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008.
27Notice that more than 30 times concerns have been raised against the only REACH regulation. Usually EU
revises regularly its regulation (also as consequence of concerns). New concerns are often related to new revisions
of regulation.
28Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 and No 1235/2008. 650 concerns were raised in 2009 in food sector.
29Given the definition of protection index in Eq. 7 and Eq. 8, tariff is a weighted mean of a percent tariff. So
it moves (on average) from 1.6% to 1.9%.
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Table 2: Average protection from tariff and TBT (2002-2012)‡
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
TBT 0.0004 0.0004 0.0054 0.0043 0.0002 0.0002 0.0073 0.0088 0.0023 0.0088 0.0160
Tariff 1.6012 1.5688 1.4518 1.6007 1.6037 1.9578 1.6035 1.6678 1.7641 1.5991 1.6542
‡ Source: WITS and STC database. Tariff and TBT computed as in Eq. 7 and Eq. 8. Simple average
across countries and sectors.
Table 3: Country average protection ‡
Country Tariff TBT TBT(share)
Austria 1.5995 0.0039 0.0034
Belgium 1.6378 0.0072 0.0030
Croatia 1.5591 0.0043 0.0029
Estonia 1.6661 0.0055 0.0030
Finland 1.4945 0.0045 0.0030
France 1.7897 0.0058 0.0037
Germany 1.6819 0.0031 0.0032
Hungary 1.6096 0.0059 0.0040
Italy 1.6553 0.0061 0.0029
Lithuania 1.6912 0.0050 0.0035
Poland 1.6405 0.0052 0.0034
Portugal 1.7012 0.0040 0.0035
Romania 1.6316 0.0043 0.0027
Slovakia 1.6325 0.0037 0.0035
Slovenia 1.7035 0.0051 0.0039
Spain 1.5933 0.0051 0.0034
Total 1.6430 0.0049 0.0033
‡ Source: Our calculation from TRAINS and
STC database. Tariff and TBT computed
as in Eq.7 and Eq.8. TBT(share) computed
as in Eq.12
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Figure 1: Average country protection (Tariff)
Source: WITS and STC database.
Figure 2: Average country protection (TBT)
Source: WITS and STC database.
5 Empirical strategy
By using the STC data on TBT for NTM protection measures as described in Section 4.3, we
investigate the relationship between NTMs and tariffs and market conditions in the EU coun-
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics - CompNet‡
Country Stat Firms Labor Productivity
Austria Mean 54.90 89.73
St.Dev 46.24 43.26
Belgium Mean 160.30 64.29
St.Dev 154.80 31.23
Croatia Mean 80.32 12.92
St.Dev 74.59 8.17
Estonia Mean 48.81 12.83
St.Dev 45.96 7.32
Finland Mean 102.02 64.64
St.Dev 97.18 40.72
France Mean 856.42 66.88
St.Dev 789.96 25.88
Germany Mean 634.36 97.76
St.Dev 614.14 36.55
Hungary Mean 216.25 7.51
St.Dev 200.19 6.63
Italy Mean 1285.81 39.37
St.Dev 1068.81 17.16
Lithuania Mean 88.77 9.01
St.Dev 92.46 4.63
Poland Mean 482.45 15.24
St.Dev 479.24 13.56
Portugal Mean 319.05 22.96
St.Dev 310.55 11.31
Romania Mean 431.50 5.22
St.Dev 438.29 3.39
Slovakia Mean 90.67 11.11
St.Dev 74.16 6.99
Slovenia Mean 53.04 13.10
St.Dev 39.76 7.54
Spain Mean 579.62 35.13
St.Dev 502.28 11.36
Total Mean 363.37 37.59
St.Dev 577.23 38.15
‡ Source: Our calculation from CompNet, sample 20E.
Sector-Year averages. Labor Productivity: value
added per worker.
tries imposing the measures. In particular, we consider the relationship between these measures
and the total number of firms selling in the domestic markets and the average productivity.
According to the theoretical model developed in Section 3, we expect the (unilateral) intro-
duction of a tariff to be positively associated with the number of domestic firms and higher
average productivity. As for NTMs, the theory predicts that the relationship between NTMs
and market conditions depends on whether the standard is being introduced for the first time
for both domestic and foreign firms, or rather, it is the extension to foreign firms of a measure
already adopted by domestic ones. In particular, in the baseline case, where the (unilateral)
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introduction of the NTM implies an increase in the marginal cost for all firms, we expect a
lower number of domestic firms, a lower share of exporters and lower average productivity, i.e.
a worsening of market conditions in the country-sector imposing the measure.
When, instead, a country introduces a standard, which has already been adopted by a
large number of domestic firms, the NTM works ‘like’ a tariff, since it represents a new cost
only for foreign exporters to the country imposing the tariff. In this case, as for tariffs, we
therefore should observe a positive relationship between NTMs, the number of firms and the
average efficiency. We will also look at whether these effects are different along the firm size
and productivity distribution.
We investigate these relationships considering empirical models in which tariffs and NTM
measures are considered separately and then a model in which they are included together. 30
We therefore start by estimating the following equations:
Ycst = a0 + a1tariffcst + a2Xcst + uc + us + ut + cst (13)
Ycst = a0 + a1NTMcst + a2Xcst + uc + us + ut + cst (14)
Ycst = a0 + a1tariffcst + a2NTMcst + a3Xcst + uc + us + ut + cst (15)
where Ycst, the dependent variables, are alternatively, the number of domestic firms or the
average labour productivity of country c in sector s at time t; tariffcst is the tariff barrier
imposed by country c in sector s at time t as in equation 7 and NTMcst are indicators of NTMs
barriers, STC on TBT, alternatively, as in equation 7 and equation 10; Xcst is a vector of other
potential control variables; in particular, we include in all specifications the imports from EU27.
uc, us and ut are country, sector and year fixed effects, respectively, and cst an error term. The
inclusion of country fixed effects allow us to control for all the unobservable country-specific
persistent characteristics which might simultaneously affect the industrial structure, i.e. number
of firms, the share of exporters, efficiency, and the level of barriers, like quality of institutions,
cultural inheritance and attitude towards competitiveness, geographical characteristics and re-
source endowments. The inclusion of sector fixed effects is useful in a framework where both
30Otherwise we would clearly have an omitted variable problem since there might be several cases in which
sectors at the two-digit level, which is what we consider, might be protected simultaneously by a tariff and a
NTM, a case that cannot have a theoretical counterpart.
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the dependent and the explanatory variables are strongly related to both the demand side and
the supply side industry characteristics; while year fixed effects allow us to control for both the
EU business cycle and those macroeconomic events that might have happened in the period
considered affecting simultaneously all EU countries. In all specifications both the dependent
variable and the explanatory variables are in logarithm, and therefore the estimated coefficients
can be interpreted as elasticities. We cluster standard errors at the country level and year to
account for serial autocorrelation.
As a second step, we investigate whether the effects of barriers might be heterogeneous
depending on firms’ size. We therefore investigate the previous relationships by interacting the
barriers, both NTMs and tariffs, with a categorical variable obtained by splitting firms into
three different classes on the basis of the employment.
We estimate the following equations:
Ycst = a0 + a1szclasscst + a2tariffcst + a3szclasscst ∗ tariffcst + a4Xcst + uc + us + ut + cst (16)
Ycst = a0 + a1szclasscst + a2NTMcst + a3szclasscst ∗ NTMcst + a4Xcst + uc + us + ut + cst (17)
Ycst = a0 + a1szclasscst + a2tariffcst + a3szclasscst ∗ tariffcst + a4NTMcst
+ a5szclasscst ∗ NTMcst + a6Xcst + uc + us + ut + cst (18)
where szclasscst is the categorical variable built by splitting firms in three groups on the
basis of their employment, namely: szclass1 (10-49), szclass2 (50-249), szclass3 (>249). The
excluded group is szclass1, i.e. smaller firms.
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Table 5: tariffs, NTMs and number of domestic firms‡
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tariff (ln) 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
TBTsh(ln) 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000)
TBT(ln) 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 2,963 2,964 2,963 2,964 2,963
R-squared 0.887 0.888 0.887 0.888 0.888
‡ Dependent variable: number of domestic firms. All models include
fixed effects at the country, sector and year level and control for the
level of import from EU27 (coefficients not reported). Standard er-
rors (in parenthesis) clustered at the country and year level. Sectors
with nfirms < 10 are excluded. Significance level: *0.10>p-value **
0.05>p-value*** 0.01>p-value.
6 Results
6.1 Tariffs, NTMs and the number of domestic firms
Table 5, where the dependent variable is the the number of domestic firms in logarithm, shows
the estimates of the models in Eq. (13) (column 1), in Eq. (14) (column 2 and 4, ), and in
Eq. (15) (in column 3 and 5). The results show a positive association, statistically significant
at the 1% level, between the tariff and the number of domestic firms in all the specifications,
in line with what expected. In particular, an increase of 1% in the tariff is associated with an
increase of 0.017% in the number of firms. These results are in line with the implication of the
theoretical model, where firms relocate production in the country protected by the tariff.
Turning the attention to the NTM, we see that the coefficients of both the TBT protection
indexes, i.e. TBT and TBT-share are in line with those of the tariff, the results showing a
positive and significant (at 1%) relationship with the number of domestic firms, the TBT-share
showing a larger elasticity (0.004%) with respect to the TBT (0.001%). Both the coefficients
are nevertheless of a smaller magnitude with respect to those of the tariff. This is also in line
with what predicted by the theory. These results suggest that the NTM measures behave in
line with the second case (3.5) that we consider in the theoretical model, where the majority of
domestic firms have already borne the cost of the standard.
Table 6 reports the results on the association between NTMs and the number of firms when
taking into account the firm size class. As before, column 1 shows the results of the estimates
of the model in Eq. 16, columns 2 and 4 those of the model in Eq. 17, while estimations of the
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model in Eq. 18 are reported in columns 3 and 5. In all models, i.e. both when considered alone
(column 1) and when included with either TBT (column 3) or with TBT-share (column 5), the
inclusion of a tariff is positively and significantly related (at 1%) with the number of firms in
the medium size class, while is not related with neither the number of small nor largest firms.
In particular, an increase of 1% in the tariff corresponds to an increase of 0.038% in the number
of medium-size firms in all the models.
Columns 2 and 3 show results for the TBT measure. Interestingly enough, we see that TBT
are negatively and significantly (at 5%) related with the number of small firms, while they are
positively and significantly related (at 5%) with the number of largest firms. In particular, an
increase of 1% in the TBT measure corresponds to a decrease of 0.012% in the number of small
firms and to an increase of 0.022% in the number of large firms. Results are confirmed, also in
the magnitude of the coefficients, when the second index of NTM protection is considered, i.e.
TBT-share, as in column 3 and 4.
It is worth noting that the heterogeneity across size classes of the relationship of both NTM
and tariffs with the number of firms, showing opposite signs depending on whether small or
large firms are considered, helps explain the small magnitude of the coefficients in the results
reported in Table 5 when size heterogeneity is not taken into account. Results by size class
show that all these measures are associated with the number of firms in the country imposing
the measure, but since these associations go in opposite directions in the different size classes,
they partially offset when the class dimension is not considered.
6.2 Tariffs and NTMs: implications for efficiency
In this Section we turn the attention to the average efficiency, proxied by the labour productivity.
Results are reported in (Table 7), where we see that the average productivity is positively and
significantly associated with both the NTM measures as expected from our theoretical model.
An increase of 1% in the TBT-share measure is associated with an increase of 0.006% in the
average productivity (statistically significant at 1%). This result is confirmed when looking
at the other measure, the TBT index, even if the magnitude of the coefficient and the level
of statistical significance are lower. In the previous analysis, by looking at the number of
firms, TBT measures seemed to behave as measures which are not new for domestic firms,
the second case in the theoretical framework (see Section 3.5). Therefore we expect them to
increase the competition at the aggregate level showing a positive association with the average
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Table 6: Tariffs, NTMs and the number of firms by size class‡
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
szclass2 -0.195** -0.058 -0.067 -0.067 -0.077
(0.084) (0.076) (0.072) (0.083) (0.079)
szclass3 -1.451*** -1.030*** -1.028*** -1.039*** -1.036***
(0.199) (0.170) (0.172) (0.169) (0.171)
TBTsh(ln) -0.012** -0.011**
(0.004) (0.004)
Tariff (ln) 0.013 0.015 0.015
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
szclass2XTBTsh 0.011** 0.010**
(0.003) (0.004)
szclass3XTBTsh 0.035** 0.035**
(0.012) (0.012)
szclass2Xtariff 0.025* 0.023* 0.023*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
TBT(ln) -0.012*** -0.012**
(0.003) (0.004)
szclass2XTBT 0.011*** 0.010**
(0.003) (0.004)
szclass3XTBT 0.035** 0.035**
(0.012) (0.012)
szclass3Xtariff -0.001 -0.007 -0.008
(0.028) (0.029) (0.029)
Tariff + szclass2XTariff 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Tariff+ szclass3XTariff 0.011 0.008 0.007
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
TBT + szclass2XTBT -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
TBT + szclass3XTBT 0.022** 0.022**
(0.009) (0.008)
TBTsh + szclass2XTBTsh -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
TBTsh + szclass3XTBTsh 0.023** 0.023**
(0.007) (0.007)
Observations 5,282 5,282 5,282 5,282 5,282
R-squared 0.789 0.790 0.790 0.790 0.790
‡ Dependent variable: number of domestic firms. AAll models include fixed effects at the
country, sector and year level and control for the level of import from EU27 (coefficients
not reported). Standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered at the country and year level.
Sectors with nfirms < 10 are excluded. Significance level: *0.10>p-value ** 0.05>p-
value*** 0.01>p-value.
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efficiency. This being also in line with the results shown in the analysis by size classes, where
TBT is positively related with large (more efficient) firms and negatively related with small
(less efficient) firms. In contrast with what predicted by our model in the long run, the tariff is
negatively associated with the average efficiency (at 10% level).31 The low effect on productivity
can be explained by the indicator we use. Labor productivity (i.e., value added per worker) or
TFP include both pure technical efficiency and firm market power (see among others De Loecker
et al. (2016); Forlani et al. (2016)). The former is a key variable of our model (efficiency is the
inverse of marginal cost c), while the latter measures the firm ability to charge a higher price
for a given demand. Therefore, trade liberalization (as a reduction in tariff) may generate
an increase in the average technical efficiency but, on the other hand, tariff reduction shrinks
domestic firms mark-up due to increased competition (pro-competitive effect). Given that our
productivity measures include both terms, the net effect could cancel out.
Table 7: tariffs, NTMs and the average efficiency‡
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tariff (ln) -0.019* -0.019* -0.019*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
TBTsh(ln) 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001)
TBT(ln) 0.003* 0.003*
(0.002) (0.002)
Observations 2,961 2,962 2,961 2,962 2,961
R-squared 0.881 0.880 0.881 0.881 0.881
‡ Dependent variable: average labour productivity. All models in-
clude fixed effects at the country, sector and year level and con-
trol for the level of import from EU27 (coefficients not reported).
Standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered at the country and
year level. Significance level: *0.10>p-value ** 0.05>p-value***
0.01>p-value.
7 Robustness
The empirical model in Section 5 may suffer from endogeneity issues. In particular, the number
of firms may affect EU decisions on trade policy, i.e. on tariffs and NTM measures, or some
unobserved characteristics may determine both the market outcome, the number of firms or the
average efficiency, and the adoption of protectionist measures. Omitted variable bias should
be reduced due to different levels of aggregation. Tariffs and NTM set at the HS6 level for
31It is worth noting that in the robustness check that we carry out the relationship is not statistically significant,
see Section 7.
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the whole EU are not likely to be affected by country-level lobbying unless some sectors are
dominated by only a few firms in a few countries. In this case, it is necessary to control for firms’
distribution at the sectoral level, which in our strategy is captured by sector fixed effect. Still,
the empirical model in Section 5 may suffer from endogeneity issues if the tariff or the NTM
measure is related to omitted variables at country-year or sector-year level. As a robustness
check we also estimate the same equations as in 13, 14 and 15 by including country-year and
sector fixed effects, allowing us to capture all those observable and unobservable factors varying
at the country-year level, like for instance gdp per capita, population, openness or country
asymmetric business cycle. Results are shown in Table 8 and Table 10 in the Appendix D, for
the number of firms and average efficiency, respectively. All results of the baseline specification
are confirmed and the magnitude of the coefficient is very similar. The only exception is the
relationship between the tariff and the average efficiency which is still negative but is not
statistically significant anymore.
As a further check we estimate the same equations as in 13, 14 and 15 by including country-
year and sector-year fixed effects. This should allow us to capture observable and unobservable
factors, common across EU countries, varying at the sector-year level, like for instance some
sector specific consequences of the financial crisis, or the housing bubble. Results for this
second check are reported in Table 9 and Table 11 in the Appendix D, for the number of firms
and average efficiency, respectively. As for the number of firms, the results of the baseline
are confirmed for both the tariff and the TBT-share measure of protection, with coefficient of a
larger magnitude, in particular in the case of the tariff. By contrast, the significance of the other
NTM measure, the TBT index, does not survive. The same applies to the relationship between
protection and average efficiency. Again, as in the previous check, the negative relationship
between the tariff and the efficiency is not statistically significant anymore, but in this check
also the TBT index does not survive.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we investigate, both theoretically and empirically, the relationship between tariff
and standard-like Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs) imposed by the EU and market conditions in
domestic EU markets, in terms of number of firms and average productivity. We also explore
whether and to what extent these effects are heterogeneous across firms, and therefore also
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affect firms’ distribution. We develop a theoretical framework to analyze (i) the introduction
of a tariff, (ii) the adoption of a new NTM by domestic firms and foreign exporters, (iii) the
extension of an already domestically adopted NTM to foreign exporters. We work within the
framework of the model by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), Section 3. We derive some testable
implications relating Non-Tariff barriers to the number of firms selling in the domestic market
and average efficiency. We take the model to the data for a group of European countries
and manufacturing industries. We combine CompNet data for 16 EU countries in 2002-2012,
providing information on firms’ performance at the industry level and by size class, with the
STC WTO-I-TIP database, providing information on Specific Trade Concerns (STC) raised
at the WTO on NTMs, in particular on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), and with the
TRAINS database providing information on Tariffs. Results are in line with the implication of
the theoretical model, where firms relocate production in the country protected by the tariff. As
for TBT we find results consistent with the second model of NTMs, those regarding only foreign
producers, where the majority of domestic firms have already borne the cost of the standard.
Here, the number of firms increases, especially large firms and also average efficiency increases.
Our results also show that the relationship of both NTMs and tariffs with the number of firms
is heterogeneous across size classes.
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A Technical Barries to Trade (TBT)
In order to guarantee the production and consumption of “safe” products without creating un-
necessary barriers to trade, WTO countries defined a set of rules under which regulate Technical
Barries to Trade (TBT).
TBT agreement aims at regulating technical standards or products requirements which
are imposed by states with the objective of protecting human health or environment. How-
ever, the existence of many standards may make difficult the actives of exporting firms. TBT
agreement aims to facilitate trade and to solve countries dispute on production standards. On
the one hand, TBT agreement recognizes countries rights to adopt the standards they consider
appropriate. On the other hand, the TBT agreement try to simplify exporting activities across
the multitude of regulations. It is achieved in different ways. First, TBT agreement encour-
ages countries to use international standards in order to uniform regulation. Second, countries
should notify to a specific committee, TBT committee, the existing and future regulations on
products standards. 32 According to the agreement, standards have to be fair and equitable33,
and any discriminatory practices between domestic produced and foreign good is discouraged.
Usually in response to notifications, countries may use the TBT Committee to discuss spe-
cific trade concerns (STCs) related to regulations or procedures of other countries that affect
trade. Raised concerns are related to regulations that may be beyond the purpose of public
safety and impose a discrimination between domestic and foreign producers. Concerns may be
raised on both existing and forthcoming regulation (both should be notified to WTO).
Differently from TBT, SPS agreement aims to protect the safety of food and to prevent
the spread of diseases among animals and plants. Morevoer, SPS measures cannot be used as
protection for domestic producers. In particular such regulation cannot be used to discrimi-
nate between countries with similar prevailing conditions. In order to export, it is necessary
to demonstrate that the exporting country achieve the same level of protection as in the im-
porting country. Similarly to TBT, governments have to provide in advance notification on
32Transparency is a fundamental point of TBT agreement. Notification, with establishment of enquiry points,
and publication requirements are the three key points.
33It is encouraged also the recognition of other countries’ assessment procedures.
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new or changed sanitary and phyto-sanitary regulations to SPS committee. As for TBT, WTO
members can raise concerns on SPS to the SPS committee.
B Proofs Section3
Proof of Result 1. Substitute for
(
cAD − s
)k+2
from the (a) to get
LB
(
cBD
)k+2
= h− (τA)−k
[
h− LB (τB)−k (cBD − s)k+2
]
. (19)
Whence, by differentiating,
dcBD/ds = −β/(α− β) < 0. (20)
where β = (τkAτB)
−k(cBD − s)k+1 and α =
(
cBD
)k+1
. Hence cBD decreases. Then, rewrite (A) as(
cAD − s
)k+2
=
(
h/LA
)− (LB/LA) (τB)−k (cBD − s)k+2 , so that:
cAD = s+ (1/L
A)
1
k+1
(
h− LB (τB)−k
(
cBD − s
)k+2) 1k+1
.
It is then easy to show that dcAD/ds > 1.Hence c
A
D − s , the identity cut off cost increases with
s. Q.E.D.
Proof of Result 3. From (Bt) one has LB
(
cBD
)k+2
= h − LA (τA)−k
(
cAD − t
)k+2
, then (At)
rewrites as
LA
(
cAD
)k+2
+ (τB)
−k
[
h− LA (τA)−k
(
cAD − t
)k+2]
= h
so that
[(
cAD
)k+1 − (τBτA)−k (cAD − t)k+1] dcAD + [(τBτA)−k (cAD − t)k+1] dt = 0.
And
dcAD
dt
= − (τBτA)
−k (cAD − t)k+1(
cAD
)k+1 − (τBτA)−k (cAD − t)k+1 < 0 since the denominator is positive. Q.E.D.
Proof of Result 4. An increase in the tariff is equivalent to a decrease in ρA hence look
at sign[− ddt(G(cBD/τB)] as equivalent to sign[− ddρA (G(cBD/τB)] = sign
[
− ddρA (cBD)
]
= (+) while
sign[− ddρA (G(cAD)] = (−) hence the numerator in G(cBD/τB)/G(cAD) increases while the denom-
inator decreases. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2. From (BBb) one obtains (before the standard)
LB(cBD)
k+2
[
3
k + 3
(
1− (τAτB)−k
)]
= γφ(1− τ−kA ). (B0)
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and from (BBa) one obtains (after the standard)
LB(cBD1)
k+2
[
3
k + 3
(
1− k + 3
3
(τAτB)
−k
)]
= γφ(1− τ−kA ). (Ba).
Hence cBD1 ≥ cBD if 1− k+33 (τAτB)−k ≤ 1− (τAτB)−k, which is true given (k+ 3)/3 > 1. Q.E.D.
C NTM - Share of protected goods
Figure 3: Average protection from tariff and NTM
Source: WITS and STC database. Tariff is computed as in Eq. 7 and Eq. 8. NTM is computed using Eq. 10
and Eq. 12
D Additional Tables
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Figure 4: Average country protection (TBT-share)
Source: WITS and STC database.
Table 8: tariffs, NTMs and number of domestic firms‡
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tariff (ln) 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
TBTsh(ln) 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000)
TBT(ln) 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 2,963 2,964 2,963 2,964 2,963
R-squared 0.891 0.892 0.891 0.892 0.892
‡ Dependent variable: number of domestic firms. All models include fixed
effects at the country by year and sector level and control for the level
of import from EU27. Standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered at the
country and year level. Significance level: *0.10>p-value ** 0.05>p-
value*** 0.01>p-value.
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Table 9: tariffs, NTMs and number of domestic firms‡
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tariff (ln) 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
TBTsh(ln) 0.007*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002)
TBT(ln) -0.008 -0.008
(0.005) (0.006)
Observations 2,963 2,964 2,963 2,964 2,963
R-squared 0.893 0.893 0.893 0.893 0.893
‡ Dependent variable: number of domestic firms. All models include
fixed effects at the country by year and sector by year level and control
for the level of import from EU27. Standard errors (in parenthesis)
clustered at the country and year level. Significance level: *0.10>p-
value ** 0.05>p-value*** 0.01>p-value.
Table 10: tariffs, NTMs and the average efficiency‡
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tariff (ln) -0.016 -0.016 -0.017
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
TBTsh(ln) 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001)
TBT(ln) 0.003* 0.003*
(0.002) (0.002)
Observations 2,961 2,962 2,961 2,962 2,961
R-squared 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.886
‡ Dependent variable: average labour productivity. All models in-
clude fixed effects at the country by year and sector level and
control for the level of import from EU27. Standard errors (in
parenthesis) clustered at the country and year level. Significance
level: *0.10>p-value ** 0.05>p-value*** 0.01>p-value.
Table 11: tariffs, NTMs and the average efficiency‡
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tariff (ln) -0.012 -0.012 -0.013
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
TBTsh(ln) 0.021** 0.021**
(0.007) (0.007)
TBT(ln) -0.005 -0.005
(0.007) (0.007)
Observations 2,961 2,962 2,961 2,962 2,961
R-squared 0.889 0.888 0.889 0.889 0.889
‡ Dependent variable: average labour productivity. All models
include fixed effects at the country by year and sector by year
level and control for the level of import from EU27. Standard
errors (in parenthesis) clustered at the country and year level.
Significance level: *0.10>p-value ** 0.05>p-value*** 0.01>p-
value.
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